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Abstract. A satisfying theory of knowledge has to explain why knowledge seems to be
better than mere true belief. In this paper, I try to show that the best reliabilist explanation
(ERA+) is still not able to solve this problem. According to an already elaborated answer
(ERA), it is better to possess knowledge that p because this makes likely that one’s future
belief of a similar kind will also be true. I begin with a metaphysical comment which gives
birth to ERA +, a better formulation of ERA. Then, I raise two objections against ERA+. The
first objection shows that the truth of the reliabilist answer requires the conception of a
specific theory of instrumental value. In the second objection, I present an example in
order to show that ERA+ actually fails to explain why it is better to possess knowledge
than a mere true belief.
1   Introduction: the Value Problem of Knowleddge
Why is it better to know that p than to possess a mere true belief that p?1 The prob-
lem of the value of knowledge constitutes one of the main issue in contemporary
epistemology. The intuition2 that it is better to possess knowledge than mere true
belief has an important historical precedent. It arouses Socrates’ astonishment in
Plato’s Meno. As Plato notices, it is not possible to account for this intuition merely
by appealing to its distinctive utility. Indeed, a true belief about the way to go to
Larissa is as useful as a piece of knowledge about the way to go to Larissa. Plato’s
explanation consists then in insisting on the stability of knowledge in comparison to
true belief. Briefly said, when one possesses one piece of knowledge about the way to
go Larissa, one is less likely to abandon one’s belief if the road seems to take the
wrong direction. When one possesses knowledge, one is more confident, one is less
easily destabilized and this is the reason why it is better to know that p than to be-
lieve truly that p.
Plato was concerned by the different practical value of knowledge in comparison
to true belief. The contemporary debate focuses on the distinctive epistemic values of
knowledge and true belief. This means that a contemporary solution will try to appeal
                                                
1 This paper presupposes that the general idea that knowledge is something more than
mere true belief is correct. As Edmund Gettier pointed out, knowledge is also very
probably something more than justified true belief. If a theory of knowledge is not able
to explain why knowledge is better than mere true belief, it is also unable to explain
why knowledge is better than justified true belief. For this reason, showing that reli-
abilism is not able to explain why knowledge is better than mere true belief allows one
to conclude that it is not able solve the value problem in general.
2 For this reason, another conceivable solution to the problem of the value of knowledge
consists in arguing that the intuition is illusory.
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exclusively to epistemic values3 —mainly truth— and not to practical values —as
utility— to explain why it is better to possess knowledge than mere true belief. Then,
the contemporary debates is not perfectly pointed by our initial question but more
accurately by the following:
(Q) Why is it epistemically better to know that p than to possess a mere true be-
lief that p?
A satisfying theory of knowledge has to answer this question.
2   The Reliabilist Answer to the Value Problem
2.1 The Immediate Reliabilist Answer
Roughly, according to process reliabilism (Goldman 1979), a piece of knowledge
consists in a true belief being produced by a reliable process. The immediate reli-
abilist answer to the value problem follows directly from this conception of knowl-
edge.
1. Truth is a value;
2. A true belief is valuable in virtue of being true;
3. A reliable process has instrumental value in virtue of causing a true belief;
4. A piece of knowledge has more value than a mere true belief because a piece of
knowledge is not only constituted by a true belief which has intrinsic value, it is
also constituted by the reliable process which has instrumental value.
2.2 The Swamping Objection
The immediate reliabilist answer has received a serious objection most famously
known as the swamping objection.4
The swamping objection denies that a state of affairs e which consists in a valuable
state produced by a reliable process p is more valuable than a state of affairs e’ which
consists in a valuable state of the same type produced by an unreliable process p’.
The objection becomes clear through an analogy. The following is Zagzebski’s
analogy (Zagzebski 2000, 2003). The state of affairs e consisting in a tasteful cup of
coffee produced by a reliable process p, by a coffee machine which generally produces
tasteful coffees does not possess more value than the state of affairs e’ consisting in a
tasteful coffee produced by an unreliable coffee machine p’. Both coffees are identi-
cally tasteful and this is the only parameter that counts in their comparative evalua-
tion. Indeed, the instrumental value that the reliable process p is supposed to add to
the value of the state of affairs e is swamped by the fact that the coffee is already
tasteful.
                                                
3 In the following paper, I simplify the expressions “epistemic value”, “epistemically
valuable”, etc, by speaking only of  “value”, “valuable”, etc.
4 In the contemporary debate, the copyright of the swamping objection is very often at-
tributed to Linda Zagzebski (Zagzebski 2000, 2003). As Goldman and Olsson pointed
out (Goldman & Olsson forthcoming), Richard Swinburn had already raised this objec-
tion (Swinburn 1999).
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In more general terms, the instrumental value of a reliable process p, i.e. the value
that a process has in virtue of being likely to produce valuable states of a certain type,
cannot be taken into account when one evaluates the total value of a state of affairs e
which consists in a valuable state of this type which has been produced by a reliable
process p. The instrumental value of p cannot be taken into account in the evaluation
of e because this instrumental value is swamped by the fact that the produced state is
already valuable.
Hence, reliabilism is wrong to appeal to the instrumental value of a reliable proc-
ess to explain the additional value of the reliably produced true belief. Indeed, like in
the coffees’ analogy, the instrumental value that the reliable epistemic process is
supposed to add to the true belief that it produces is swamped by the fact that the
belief produced is already true.
Erik Olsson (Olsson 2006) summarizes the swamping objection in perfectly clear
terms: “All additional instrumental epistemic value accruing to a particular case of
reliable production would have to come from that very belief that was reliably pro-
duced; but if that belief is already true, there is no room for reliable production to
contribute instrumental epistemic value.”
2.3 The Elaborated Reliabilist Answer (ERA)
Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson (Goldman & Olsson forthcoming) defend a more
elaborated answer to the value problem which avoids the swamping objection.
The state of affairs e consisting in a true belief produced by a reliable process p has
more value than the state of affairs e’ consisting in a mere true belief because
(1) Truth is a value;
(2) The property of making it likely that one’s future beliefs of a similar kind will
also be true is a valuable property to possess, in virtue of (1);
(3) The state of affairs e consisting in a true belief produced by a reliable process p
makes likely that one’s future beliefs of a similar kind will also be true;
(4) The state of affairs e’ consisting in a true belief does not make likely that one’s
future beliefs of a similar kind will also be true
(5) The state of affairs e consisting in a true belief produced by a reliable process p
has additional value in virtue of possessing this property.
This answer avoids the swamping objection since the value that a state of affairs e
possesses in virtue of exemplifying this property is not swamped by the fact that the
belief which constitutes e is already true. Indeed, the state of affairs e draws its addi-
tional value from the value of the future true beliefs of a similar kind.
3   A Metaphysical Requirement
It is fruitful to consider the elaborated reliabilist answer ERA from a metaphysical
point of view. Which kinds of things could be the bearers of the property of enhanc-
ing the probability of future true beliefs?
Contrary to what Goldman and Olsson (Goldman & Olsson forthcoming) seem to
do, it is incorrect to attribute this property to the state of affairs consisting in a par-
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ticular state of affairs produced by a particular reliable process. Such a particular state
of affairs does not make likely that one’s future beliefs of a similar kind will also be
true. When one subject x possesses such a reliably produced belief, this gives maybe a
reason to think that x possesses a reliable epistemic disposition whose exercises are
likely to produce true beliefs. But it is only the possession of such a reliable epis-
temic disposition—for example, the reliable disposition of perceiving things in the
darkness— which enhances the probability of subsequent true beliefs and which can
be identified as the bearer of this property.
Since the state of affairs e consisting in a particular true belief produced by a par-
ticular reliable process, i.e. a piece of knowledge, cannot be conceived as the bearer of
the valuable property, ERA has to be formulated differently:
A better elaborated reliabilist answer (ERA+)
The state of affairs e consisting in a true belief produced by a reliable process p has
more value than the state of affairs e’ consisting in a mere true belief because
(1) Truth is a value
(2) The property of making it likely that one’s future beliefs of a similar kind will
also be true is a valuable property to have, in virtue of (1);
(3) The state of affairs E consisting in the possessing of a reliable epistemic dispo-
sition has the property of making likely that one’s future beliefs of a similar kind
will also be true;
(4) The state of affairs E consisting in the possessing of a reliable epistemic dispo-
sition is a valuable state of affairs in virtue of having this property;
(5) The state of affairs e consisting in a true belief produced by the exercise of a re-
liable epistemic disposition is also valuable in virtue of being constituted by the
exercise of such a valuable disposition.
The clause (5) explains how e draws its value from the valuable property of enhancing
the probability of subsequent true beliefs without exemplifying it. In Goldman and
Olsson (forthcoming), one finds an explanation of the same kind but, curiously, this
explanation is not given in reaction to the metaphysical requirement. This explanation
is presented as a “second solution” to the swamping objection.
This  “second solution” consists in distinguishing two kinds of value instrumen-
talism —token instrumentalism and type instrumentalism— and in claiming then
that the additional value of knowledge is explained by applying the type instrumen-
talism.
Token instrumentalism:
A process is instrumentally good in accordance with the token instrumentalism if
it derives its positive value from the goodness of its effects.
Process instrumentalism:
A process is instrumentally good in accordance with the type instrumentalism if it
derives its positive value from the goodness of the effects which other processes of
the same type are likely to produce.
For instance, according to the token instrumentalism, a reliable surgical procedure
which fails does not have any instrumental value. But, according to the type instru-
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mentalism, the procedure does have an instrumental value. The particular procedure
draws its value from the value of the recoveries that other procedures of the same type
are likely to produce. In an analogous way, a particular reliable epistemic process
derives its instrumental value from the value of the true beliefs that other processes of
the same type are likely to produce. A particular epistemic process does not derive its
instrumental value from the value of the particular true belief it produces. In this way,
the “second solution” avoids the swamping objection.
I think that Goldman and Olsson’s “second solution” should be rather considered
as an improvement of their first solution which tries to conciliate the metaphysical
requirement. Like ERA+, their “second solution” explains how a particular true belief
produced by a particular process can derive its value from the value of other subse-
quent true beliefs.
Nevertheless, my goal here is not to consider the details of these different explana-
tions. I have insisted on the necessity to formulate the reliabilist answer by taking
into account the metaphysical requirement because I think that such a formulation
teaches us something important about this answer. When one formulates the elabo-
rated reliabilist in this way, it becomes patent that the possession of a disposition to
acquire further true beliefs is necessary to explain why it is better to possess knowl-
edge than a mere true belief. Then, according to a reliabilist answer which take into
account the metaphysical requirement, a subject S who possesses a piece of knowl-
edge is necessary in the following epistemic situation:
(i) S possesses a true belief and;
(ii) S possesses a valuable epistemic disposition which makes her likely to acquire
future true beliefs of the same kind.
The possession of such a valuable disposition is a necessary constituent of the
epistemic situation of the subject who knows because it is necessary to explain the
additional value of knowledge in comparison to true belief.
4   Objections
4.1 The One Shot Objection
Bob is a very passionate entomologist. He devoted his life to study two kinds of
Brazilian spiders which are both very rare and very similar. Thanks to his work, he is
able to distinguish one spider of the first kind from one of the other if he should meet
one. When he is 90 and very sick, he realizes that he has never seen one of these
spiders although he spent more than 20 years in the jungle hoping to observe one of
them. He decides to travel a last time to Brazil. By cutting a pat in the jungle with
difficulty, he comes across one spider of the first kind and acquires the true belief that
this is a spider of the first kind. Bob flies back to London and dies some days later.
This example puts a finger on a difficulty for reliabilism. From a reliabilist point
of view, Bob’s true belief about the spider is certainly a piece of knowledge since it
has been produced by a reliable process. Moreover, it is certainly better to possess
this true belief owing to years of efforts than to possess the same true belief by
chance.
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Nevertheless, ERA is not able to explain why Bob’s knowledge has more value
than a true belief acquired accidentally since it is not true that Bob’s reliably produced
true belief makes him likely to have further true beliefs of the same type. Indeed,
when Bob sees the spider, it is already certain that he will never see other spiders of
this kind since he will never go back to Brazil.
Does ERA+ score better? According to ERA+, a particular true belief produced by
the exercise of a reliable epistemic disposition draws its own value from the value
which characterizes this disposition. The epistemic disposition is instrumentally
valuable. It derives its value from the value of the true beliefs which it makes likely
to produce. Hence, at last, the particular true belief produced by a reliable process
derives its value from the value of these other true beliefs. Until now, I have not
marked whether these other true beliefs are actual true beliefs or potential true beliefs.
This question has some influence on the ability of ERA+ to answer the one shot
objection. Indeed, if one claims that the disposition derives its value from the value
of the other actual true beliefs which this disposition makes one likely to produce,
then ERA+ is not able to answer the one shot objection since Bob’s disposition does
not make him likely to possess other actual true beliefs of the same type. To save
ERA+, the reliabilism has to say that the epistemic disposition derives its value from
the other potential true beliefs which this disposition makes one likely to produce.5
This claim presupposes a theory of value according to which instrumental value
can be derived from the value of potential states of affairs. Maybe, it is possible to
elaborate such a theory of value but, in any case, it would be a hard task to carry out.
Indeed, such a theory runs the risk of attributing instrumental value to states of affairs
which are valueless. For instance, my sweater being red is potentially able to save me
from being run over by a car but, as long as it does not actually save me from such
an accident, it seems very strange to attribute some instrumental value to it. The one
shot objection is probably not a determinate objection against the best reliabilist
answer ERA+ but its makes clear that such an answer requires the elaboration of a
theory of value which explains how to attribute instrumental value in virtue of the
value of potential states of affairs.
4.2 The Competent Omniscient Objection6   
The Competent Omniscient (CO) and the Lucky Omniscient (LO) are two supernatu-
ral beings living in the same world. They differ only with respect to their epistemic
situations.
The epistemic situation of the Competent Omniscient is the following:
(a) CO possesses all the true belief it is ever possible to possess.
(b) CO’s true beliefs result from his perfectly reliable faculties and hence, CO’s
true beliefs are pieces of knowledge.
                                                
5 As Goldman and Olsson point out (Goldman & Olsson forthcoming), the same thing i s
true concerning the solution which appeals to type instrumentalism.
6 I am indebted to Olivier Massin for the conception of this objection.
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The epistemic situation of CO is such that it is not only actually true that the fac-
ulties of CO produce further true beliefs but it is also impossible that CO’s facul-
ties produce further true beliefs.
The epistemic situation of the Lucky Omniscient is the following:
(a’) LO possesses all the true belief it is ever possible to possess.
(b’) LO does not possess any epistemic faculties. It is only by accident that LO
possesses all the true beliefs it is ever possible to possess. LO’s true beliefs do not
constitute pieces of knowledge.
I do not see why the Platonic intuition would not be valid when one evaluates the
epistemic states of CO. Why the intuition which is uppermost for the piece of knowl-
edge of a subject who do not have all the possible true beliefs would suddenly be
invalid for the pieces of knowledge of a subject who possesses all the true beliefs it is
ever possible to have. We really have the intuition that CO’s true beliefs are better
than LO’S true beliefs. Nevertheless, the reliabilist answer is not able to explain why
it is the case since, in this situation, it is not even possible to appeal to the value of
potential further true beliefs.
5   Conclusions
By deriving the entire value of knowledge from the value of the truths it promotes,
the reliabilist answer fails to account for another important intuition which pushes us
to evaluate knowledge as a better epistemic state than a mere true belief.
A subject S seems to possess knowledge only when S “has a lot to do” with her
possession of a true belief. When a subject S possesses a true belief only accidentally,
without playing a salient role in the occurrence of her true belief (Greco 2002), for
instance in Gettier-cases, we do not attribute knowledge to S. This characteristic of
knowledge is able to explain why it constitutes a better epistemic state than a mere
true belief (Greco 2002, forthcoming, Pritchard forthcoming, Riggs 2002, Sosa
2003). Shortly, knowledge is better than a mere true belief as the victory of Rodgeur
Federer is better than the same victory achieved just by luck, by a tennis player with-
out talent. It seems than a valuable state of affairs has still more value when a subject
can be held responsible for its occurrence than when its occurrence is due to mere
luck.
Moreover, the objection of the Competent Omniscient shows that an appeal to this
characteristic of knowledge is sometimes the only way to explain the additional value
of knowledge in comparison to true belief. Indeed, the epistemic situation of CO and
the epistemic situation of LO diverge only with respect to this characteristic. CO has
a lot to do with the possession of his true beliefs and this is what explains why CO’s
epistemic situation is better than LO’s.
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